The paper argues that a good philosophical investigation employs various methods, but there exists a constant temptation in philosophy to become obsessed by one method as opposed to another. It was once supposed to be two rival methods for practicing analytical philosophy: the ordinary language method and the formal logic method. Yet, those methods were not genuinely rival, as they were usually used to answer different questions. A method supposed to be in opposition to the analytic methods was developed by (...) phenomenology. The phenomenological method — suitable for analyzing phenomena of our own experience — is not however applicable to certain important philosophical issues. One of them is: how do we get from sound to meaning? The answer to this question provided by the Heideggerian method proves that phenomenologists cannot hear the question and cannot grasp the answer given by the author, for they mistakenly think that the question: \"what is the logical relation between sound and meaning\" is reducible to the phenomenological question; how does it seem to the agent. The same problem arises with regard to social reality. Thus, the phenomenological method is inadequate to answer such questions, because it does not allow to recognize the distinction between brute facts and reality built upon them (such as institutional facts), and logical relations between them. Phenomenology will enable us to begin the investigation, but in order to keep going with the investigation we should go beyond the level of phenomenology to the level of underlying logical structures. The lesson to be drawn from the above considerations is that there is a variety of methods suitable for philosophical investigations and the general principle is to let the nature of the problem dictate the method for its solution rather than letting the nature of methods dictate the sort of problems regarded as important. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to study the role and features of proofs in mathematics. Formal and informal proofs are distinguished. It is stressed that the main roles played by proofs in mathematical research are verification and explanation. The problem of the methods acceptable in informal proofs, in particular of the usage of computers, is considered with regard to the proof of the Four-Color Theorem. The features of in-formal and formal proofs are compared and contrasted. It is stressed that (...) the concept of an informal proof is not precisely defined, it is simply practised and any attempts to define it fail. It is — so to speak — a practical notion, psychological, sociological and cultural in character. The second one is precisely defined in terms of logical con-cepts. Hence it is a logical concept which is rather theoretical than practical in char-acter. The first one is — in part at least — semantical in nature, the second is entirely syntactical. A proof-theoretical thesis, similar to the Turing-Church Thesis in the re-cursion theory, is formulated. It says that both concepts of a proof in mathematics are equivalent. Arguments for and against it are formulated. (shrink)

The article presents the results of research conducted in the master degree thesis, prepared at the Institute of Theory of Literature, Theatre and Audiovisual Arts, University of Lodz, under the supervision of prof. Assoc. Jarosław Płuciennik. First I present a theoretical and methodological frame of analysis of the text (especially taken form cognitive psychology of concepts: category, categorization, prototype and similarity), the second I present interpretation of terminology in relation to the concept genre and based on it doing a cognitive (...) analysis such categories as: epic poem, heroic poetry or monk heroic poetry, based on Trans-Atlantyk by Witold Gombrowicz. The summary is an attempt to reference the conclusions derived from the analysis to the debate on the nature of the two aestethic categories – ‘style’ and ‘stylization’. These concepts are not – I suppose – immanent properties of the text, but mental constructs, first existing on mind of cognizing person. The cognitive methodology allows this aspect capture and describe. (shrink)

In the paper the idea of the well-known anti-realistic argument from the so-called pessimistic meta-induction is considered. It is ascertained - contrarily to the widespread belief - that Larry Laudan is not the author of the argument, however he has noticed many of its essential aspects, especially the problem of historical continuity between changing scientific theories. It seems that as the author of the argument should be regarded rather Hilary Putnam. A similar idea of pessimistic meta-induction was already anticipated in (...) the work of Henri Poincaré. The paper finishes with conclusion, that scientific realism as a philosophical position has to take into account both the problem of the empirical success of scientific theories and the problem of continuity between them. (shrink)

The notion of so-called "postulated ontology" appears in the context of a well- -known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, if the thesis (...) of underdetermination holds, such philosophical solutions are not imposed by science itself. In order to arrive at some kind of ontology based on science, it seems necessary to accept certain philosophical presuppositions in the first place. This, and the fact that scientific theories change in time show that although such a kind of ontology is possible, and perhaps desirable, it can never be ultimate. (shrink)

Civil law norms give a considerable space for ethical value judgments. In this respect, the key role is played by the provisions called “general clauses” that refer to extra-juridical value judgments and oblige to take them into account in the process of deciding in civil law cases. The purpose of such clauses is to ensure the necessary flexibility of law and to influence the shaping of proper human relations. In the field of economic activity they are to favour the attitudes (...) of honesty, of mutual trust and of readiness to serve others – the values which constitute a basis for the system of free market competition. A separate question is how to realize these assumptions in the practice of adjudicating which remains the task of courts and tribunals and their case law. (shrink)

The subject matter of the paper is an analysis of the role of 'wit' in J. Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding". The analysis shows that this apparently marginal issue plays in Locke's text ambivalent role. Interpreted by Locke as assemblage of ideas on the basis of their similarity, wit is, on the one hand, explicitly excluded from the domain of philosophy and situated within the sphere of aesthetic pleasure. On the other hand wit is an implicit constitutive element of (...) a number of "Essay's" important philosophical issues, especially those of mind and of ideas formation. The analysis of wit may also be regarded as a contribution to the history of the philosophical treatment of wit and some related problems, such as inventiveness. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the relation of alternativity between possible worlds, the primary concept for relational semantics. We have focused only on epistemic and doxastic logics. The paper presents two approaches to these logics: J. Hintikka’s position and R. Stalnaker’s position.

An article is an introductory analysis of concept of religious belief in the language of logic. In its first part, there is a comparison of the concept of religious belief with the concept of scientific belief, next part is a presentation and analysis of Bocheński’s conception of rationality of religious beliefs, and the third part of article is an attempt of analysis of Aquinas conception of faith in the light of contemporary logic.

Several remarks on the book by Professor Andrzej Kisielewicz, Logic and Argumentation. Practical Course in Critical ThinkingProfessor Andrzej Kisielewicz’s book concerns active forms and methods of teaching logic, also outside the context of university education. It possesses prac­tical value and may also be an auxiliary material for, among others, high school students. Despite some shortcomings, such as unjustified ascription of the status of hypothesis to statements, a flawed definition of the methodological and epistemological concept of a historical fact, it contains (...) many valuable and original logical propositions pertaining to critical and logical thinking.Undoubtedly, the book will be useful in education and helpful in introducing teachers and learners to using grammatical and logical rules. It will allow the reader to detect post-truth in the media or the shuffling of premises in argumentation. After implementing indispensable corrections and additions, it should become an obligatory reading — not only in the context of university education. (shrink)

A philosopher of politics should not be a social engineer, even if he were to dabble in piecemeal engineering, in Popper’s sense; he should rather be a social surveyor, responsible for measuring a plot of land for development, for which politicians should in turn be responsible. That measured land is ordered by a system of philosophical notions and critical studies, together with comments on the history of political thought. One of the outcomes of a philosopher’s work should be an ordered (...) thought, i.e. objective knowledge that includes genesis and evolution of philosophical notions, relationships between ideas, and presentation of the cultural background, from which those ideas originated. In this reconstruction work a philosopher of politics needs to move in between the allowed boundaries of the text under analysis. A philosopher does what others cannot do due to the separation of exact sciences from philosophy. Therefore, a philosopher is not beyond scientific inquiries; he can use them as confidently as representatives of those sciences. It can be argued that a philosopher has a unique position in the social life of every group. (shrink)